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A strategic approach to financing public transport 
through property values 
Marcus Enoch, Stephen Potter, and Stephen Ison 
Traditional sources of finance are becoming inadequate to meet the needs of public 
transport. This has led to the emergence of a number of local earmarked tax and 
charging mechanisms, in particular road user charges and tolls. This article 
examines one group of such mechanisms: charges to property owners and developers, 
and draws on worldwide examples of the practical use of a number of such schemes. 
There are a number of practical difficulties with capturing value from property 
owners and developers, and these are detailed with a commentary on best practice. 
In the UK, the funding of public transport infrastructure projects has been the subject 
of much debate over recent years. There is little doubt that further investment is 
needed to refurbish, upgrade and build new public transport systems, but the 
suggested sources of the finance, whether private or public, and the funding 
mechanisms vary widely. What is becoming clear is that public transport projects will 
increasingly involve raising capital that will be repaid via a future revenue stream. A 
key issue in the UK is that, while mechanisms are being put in place for local 
transport authorities and other public bodies to raise capital loans, there are few 
revenue streams available to help repay those loans.  
For example, the UK Government’s July 2004 Comprehensive Spending Review 
authorised the London Mayor to proceed with a £3bn programme of public transport 
development schemes funded through borrowing. This has forced the Mayor to raise 
public transport fares by 2-3% above inflation in order to service the interest on the 
debt. Raising fares by 2-3%, while the real cost of motoring is falling, suggests that 
such an approach could well be self-defeating in the long term and seems counter-
productive to UK transport policy.  Outside London the options are even more 
restricted, as public transport fares and investment decisions are in the hands of 
deregulated and privatised operators.  
To address the growing funding problem, a number of countries have adopted 
‘earmarked’ revenue streams to support public transport, although for many this has 
been undertaken in order to subsidise fare reductions rather than support capital 
investment. In France, for example, the Versement Transport (employer tax) was 
introduced in 1971 and played a major part in funding the upgrading and expansion of 
the Paris Metro. Rolled out nationwide, the tax has part-funded the new light rail and 
metro systems that now exist in every French city.  
In the UK a far more recent initiative has been Central London’s congestion charge, 
which has helped finance the upgrading of bus services to accommodate the rise in 
passengers associated with the 20% cut in road traffic achieved by the charge. In 
some places, hypothecated parking charges and fines aid the funding of public 
transport and, in the United States, local motor and consumption taxes are a common 
source of earmarked revenue, with taxes on goods as varied as cigarettes, beer, hotel 
bills, gambling, electricity, or a general sales tax, used to support or develop public 
transport systems.  
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Conflicting rationale 
Local earmarked taxes and charges have emerged over a number of years and in 
different specific situations. In analysing these measures three main groupings have 
been identified which represent alternative principles of public finance (Ubbels et al 
2004.). These are: 
• Beneficiary Pays;  
• Polluter Pays; 
• Spreading the Burden.  
Beneficiary pays (public good) 
The oldest rationale for taxation is to fund public goods that cannot be provided on a 
market exchange basis. Defence, the police force, ambulance and fire services are 
obvious examples as are most roads and also certain aspects of public transport. 
There thus exists an established public finance rationale to, for example, impose a 
local charge where public transport investment takes place or to employers located in 
that area. Apart from the example of the Versement Transport  in France, there are  
also hypothecated taxes on property, land values and developers.  
A further example is provided by a study commissioned by the Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors which examined how planned improvements to London’s 
transport infrastructure could be financed (Whelan, 2003). This particularly focused 
on property taxes, since the property value impact of public transport schemes can be 
significant. Measures considered included a business rate levy, tax incremental 
financing, Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), land value taxation and a green-
field development tax. The potential yield of these was estimated at between £10M - 
£450M per annum.  
Polluter pays (market failure) 
The ‘polluter pays principle’ is a more recent, less well established, approach to both 
national and local taxation. This is theoretically rooted in Pigouvian taxation 
principles of marginal social cost pricing of transport externalities, although actual 
measure rarely reflect such rigor - hence our use of the less precise term ‘polluter 
pays’.  
In several countries, transport and environment ministries view ‘polluter pays’ taxes 
as a tool of transport demand management. As a result, a new group of measures has 
emerged, reflecting a different set of public finance principles centred on using the tax 
system to cut environmental externalities such as air pollution, climate change gas 
emissions and accidents, all of which result in the transport market operating in an 
economically inefficient manner. Pricing measures can internalise these external 
costs. This is the idea behind the European Commission’s Green Paper on Fair and 
Efficient Pricing for Transport (CEC, 1995) and a variety of national measures used 
in the UK and elsewhere, including parking and congestion charges, road tolls and the 
Fuel Duty Escalator.  
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Spreading the Burden (equity and social inclusion) 
The third group of fiscal measures is linked to the role that public transport plays in 
social inclusion. In consequence it might be expected that the sources of finance 
would be progressive in taxation terms. In reality however the issue of whether the 
taxes and charges to pay for public transport are themselves equitable does not seem 
to feature in any significant way. For example, the general sales tax, the most widely 
used earmarked charge in the US for funding public transport, is regressive. It falls 
disproportionately on the poorer members in society. Given the resistance of US 
citizens to paying taxes - especially as local referendums are often required to 
introduce them - such apparently contradictory pragmatism can perhaps be 
understood.  The remainder of this article concentrates on one under-researched area, 
that of property owners and developer funding.  
Property owners and developer funding 
The private benefit of a public transport service or development can be substantial. A 
public transport development such as London’s Jubilee Line, serving the Docklands, 
provides a large positive externality to property developers and businesses in the area. 
This notion of ‘value capture’ from beneficiaries of public transport investment is 
appearing on the policy agenda, reinforced by the shortfall of current funding sources 
and the transport policy problems associated with real fare increases. 
Tsukada and Kuranami (1994) define value capture as a mechanism “by which the 
agency responsible for the development of the urban transport infrastructure captures 
part of the financial benefit gained by land developers or the community at large.” 
This process of ‘value capturing’ or ‘realising betterment’, can involve property taxes 
and developer levies. In discussing these, we draw upon work conducted as part of a 
European Commission research project (Van den Branden et al, 2000) and reported 
subsequently in Unfare Solutions (Ubbels et al, 2004). 
The range of property and developer measures can be grouped under three main 
headings, although there can be some overlap in practice between these (Figure 1): 
• Compulsory capture of value enhancement through taxes and charges;  
• Voluntary capture through a partnership agreement between developers or 
property owners and the state; 
• An endowment of land received by the transport operator, in addition to that 
which is strictly needed for a transport project, in order to generate additional 
receipts.  
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Figure 1: The three groups of property value capture mechanisms  
Taxes and Charges (compulsory capture) 
Paying for the provision of public services through local property taxes, is a fairly 
common method world-wide, used throughout Europe, Australasia and North 
America. In the USA, earmarking a proportion of a property tax for public transport 
became popular among local governments because it is based on immobile objects 
and so is difficult to evade. It is also easy to administer because it is simply a 
supplement to an existing tax and local authorities already administer land ownership 
records (Goldman, Corbett and Wachs, 2001).  
Earmarked property taxes 
In the USA, earmarked property taxes have been the most common method for 
supporting public transport systems. Cities levying such taxes include Anchorage, 
Minneapolis/St Paul, New York, Denver, Detroit, Milwaukee and Miami (Simpson, 
1994). In addition a mortgage tax, effectively a form of property tax, is used to fund 
public transport in several parts of New York State, including Albany and Buffalo 
(Bushell, 1994). The most common form is a dedicated surcharge whether, temporary 
or permanent, undertaken for a specific purpose. 
One typical example of the earmarked property tax is administered in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota (Gibbons, 2000; Metropolitan Council, 1999). In 1999, an earmarked 
property tax raised $US62.5M, covering just over 40% of Metro-Transit’s 
$US156.2M operating budget. The local property tax was introduced in 1971, when 
the Metro Transit Commission was formed in order to operate public transport, and 
the tax currently applies to the 970,000 residential properties in the metropolitan 
council area. The tax is a flat rate in each county, but is ‘feathered’ so that residents of 
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the counties better served by transit services, most notably in the downtown areas pay 
more than suburban householders.  
There are several problems with the Minneapolis property tax. First, it is capped so 
that revenue can grow only when property values rise. At times when property prices 
are flat, income raised has been static, even though the cost of providing transit 
services has risen. Second, property prices and thus the levels of service have risen in 
the ‘cash rich’ suburban counties, but not in the city area, where the need for transit is 
greatest. Primarily as a result of these factors, it looks like a dedicated local sales tax 
will replace the transit element of the property tax. As a major funding source, the 
way Minneapolis’ property tax is designed tends to provide financial resources in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. 
Benefit Assessment Districts 
The Benefit Assessment District (BAD) approach seeks to overcome some of the 
problems associated with the general property tax. Benefit assessment is a fee on 
property used to fund part or all the capital investment that enhances the value of the 
property. Assessments must be proportional to any benefit to a property and a BAD 
cannot be established unless an engineering report identifies, and provides a method 
to calculate, the special benefits produced (Knox, 1996). In addition, property owners 
must be given notice and provided with a public hearing before an assessment district 
can be formed.  
In theory, assessments should apportion project capital costs between benefiting 
property owners based on the value of the additional benefits each receives. In reality, 
it is difficult to isolate the impact of one capital expenditure from other influences on 
property values. An example of a BAD is in San Francisco where, from 1962 to 1999 
it was used to raise funds for the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system (Ubbels et 
al, 2004). A BAD was also used to part-finance the construction of the Los Angeles 
Red Line with two districts formed in 1985 (MTA for Los Angeles, 2002). 
Assessments received from these districts helped pay off bond funding for station 
construction on the first segment of the Metro Red Line. Assessment payments will 
terminate in 2008/09. Overall, 9% of the $US1.4bn cost of this part of the Metro Red 
Line was raised through BADs.  
Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) 
In the UK, a BID involves a supplement to the business rate in a specified district. 
This needs to be approved by a 50% vote by those paying business rates in the area. 
The vote is 50% by rateable value and so voting is weighted by the size of businesses 
according to how much they contribute to business rates. This is a recent mechanism, 
not confined to transport improvements but for any improvement within the specified 
district. The first vote for a BID took place in October 2004 in Kingston-upon-
Thames for a 1% business rate supplement in order to raise £4M of additional funding 
for improvements to a shopping area (Cumberbatch, 2004). A BID is proposed to help 
fund London’s Crossrail project. BIDs have also been used in the United States for a 
number of years. 
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Summary 
A major advantage of earmarked property taxes is they are an ‘add-on’ to an existing 
tax, reducing administrative costs. They also provide a relatively large and stable 
revenue base. But property taxes can be unpopular and supplements raise the visibility 
of the tax, potentially increasing taxpayer resistance (Slack, 2001). A key 
disadvantage is that the base of the property tax may not increase as property 
valuations are only occasionally updated. To maintain revenues requires increasing 
the rate of the tax. There are also equity issues as poorer areas requiring public 
transport improvements yield less tax revenue than richer areas away from the public 
transport routes.  
More fundamentally, financial institutions have come to view property development 
as too risky as security for infrastructure loans and Farrell (1999) notes that crises in 
the property market in the USA cut enthusiasm for this funding method. Property 
taxes may be limited to where ‘safe’ rises in land values occur, possibly where land is 
already in state ownership or has very low acquisition costs.  
Impact fees 
An example of how a UK local authority has sought to adapt developer charges (see 
below) is Cambridge City Council, which has developed a mechanism for charging 
developers according to the number of trips a site generates (Collins, 2002).  
Two Area Transport Plans (ATPs) were adopted by the Supplementary Planning 
Guidance to the Cambridge Local Plan in 2000. These identify what new transport 
infrastructure and service provision is needed to facilitate large-scale development 
and then provides a robust means of calculating how individual development sites in 
the area should contribute towards the fulfilment of that transport infrastructure. 
Again this is not value capture, but an area-based assessment of the public cost 
imposed by the development. The ATPs do this by designing and costing the transport 
system necessary to support the planned development. A fee per trip per day is 
derived by dividing the cost of the transport upgrade by the number of generated trips 
in the ATP zone. Any development that generates more than 100 additional person 
trips (all modes) per day is liable for payments, which are proposed at £229 per 
additional generated trip. A recent review is proposing to lower the threshold to 50 
person-trips per day. A similar impact fee mechanism – the Transport Impact 
Development Fund - is also in operation in San Francisco (TCRP, 1998). 
Developer Charges 
Developer charges and impact fees seek to compensate the community for the extra 
costs of public facilities arising from a private development. In the UK, USA (and 
many other countries) such charges are individually negotiated and often vary more 
by economic conditions affecting the development than the actual costs imposed upon 
the local community (USEPA, 1999). Bluntly, if a city is desperate for a development 
then no charge will be made, but if a developer is keen to locate in an area, the local 
authority will be in a strong position to exact a charge. 
 8
In the UK, developer charges often occur in the form of a ‘Section 106 agreement’, 
named after the section of the Town and Country Planning Act that provides powers 
for councils to set a payment as a condition of planning consent. In Scotland this is 
called a ‘Section 54 agreement’, after the parallel section in Scotland’s own Act. 
Moore (2001) provides an example of a Section 106 Agreement that funded public 
transport. This was between Bracknell Forest Council and developer Helical Bar 
Developments (South East). A contribution of £50,000 indexed from agreement to the 
date of payment was to be paid on occupation of the site by the developer. The 
payment was to cover the costs of providing public transport services the routes of 
which include a link between the Western Industrial Area of Bracknell and the 
railway and bus stations in Bracknell town centre.  
Such developer charges are made when granting planning permission and, by their 
nature, are concentrated in growth areas. This makes it difficult to use developer 
charges to support general public transport investment in a town or city as a whole, 
although this has been attempted at some locations. The income source is also 
irregular.  
Summary 
Charges by local authorities as part of granting developers planning permission are 
commonplace. Increasingly these are used to provide infrastructure support for public 
transport and, although difficult, sometimes also revenue subsidies as well. But 
developer levies have a number of practical limitations. The greatest need for public 
transport investment is often in places where only limited development is taking 
place, or in areas in need of regeneration. However developer levies are sporadic in 
time and space - in general being available in growth areas and at times of economic 
boom. Crucially, they are one-off fees, and the cost of public transport investment can 
change. For example, the £400M contribution to the cost of building the Jubilee Line 
by the developers of Canary Wharf in London seemed appropriate at the time, but the 
costs rose and the need for more public transport investment was greater than 
originally anticipated. The fee however had been paid and no further retrospective 
payment could be asked for.  
Developer levies are also criticised for deterring development and increasing new 
housing costs, plus resulting in competition between local authorities. In sum, 
developer levies have selected uses but have severe limitations as a major general 
source of public transport finance.  
Partnerships Deals (voluntary capture) 
The second major group of financing measures involves the voluntary capture of 
some part of the rise in land and property values associated with public transport 
development. This covers a variety of deals and partnerships between land owners, 
property developers and the city authority or public transport operators. If a property 
developer calculates that a better public transport service will enhance the value of a 
development or the rents that can be charged, it makes business sense to enter into a 
voluntary agreement to pay part, or all of the costs involved. This is a simple 
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commercial arrangement with a return on investment to the property developer or 
owner.   
Connection fees 
The most basic level involves connection fees. These are simply a charge to property 
owners for a good physical connection to an existing municipal utility, for example, a 
charge to the owners/developers of both existing and new buildings for a direct 
connection to a station (McDaniel and White, 1999). They may be a one-off charge or 
an annual connection charge.  
One example of a connection fee occurred in Toronto, Canada. The developer O&Y 
Properties Inc. wished to directly link a proposed 20-storey office complex to an 
adjacent metro station (TTC, 2001). O&Y Properties Inc. agreed to pay to the Toronto 
Transit Commission an entrance connection fee in annual instalments of $C28,292.  
Such connection fees generate a relatively small income flow, but often such 
connections are provided free to the user. 
Benefit sharing 
For a large property development, a more substantial investment could be 
commercially viable. In the USA, these are called ‘benefit sharing’ or ‘joint 
development schemes’.  A benefit sharing agreement usually contains legally binding 
language between the parties. Sometimes, projects may be initiated through a co-
development; i.e. an informal working arrangement in which the public agency and 
the private developer work together to complete their individual projects in a mutually 
beneficial way. In this case, the co-developers attempt to site and co-ordinate their 
projects based on a non-binding legal agreement.  Examples of benefit sharing, or 
joint development schemes, are widespread. The US Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Authority (WMATA) is well known for benefit sharing agreements. Its joint 
development-land use department has a mission that includes station area 
development and land use planning.  
If a public transport development enhances land values and rents, then such deals 
should be in the commercial interests of property developers. However, in practice 
entirely voluntary commercial deals are rare. The private sector expects public 
authorities to provide services in return for paying normal business taxes. A second 
factor is that the benefits are usually spread over a wide number of users making 
individual deals nebulous and difficult to negotiate. However, there are some 
circumstances where a public transport authority can enter into deals and partnerships. 
The main factor is whether they have the expertise to do so.  
Endowment funding 
Endowment funding mechanisms involve a form of betterment capture where the state 
or public transport operator owns property and land in addition to that needed to run 
transport services. They sell the land when its value rises or enter into development 
deals to secure an income from the property itself. Endowment income can arise for 
purely historical and coincidental reasons, but in some cases it is a planned funding 
strategy.  
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Betterment capture 
An attempted endowment funding was the Beckton extension of the Docklands Light 
Railway (DLR) in East London. This was to have been funded by selling newly 
serviced development land to recoup the initial investment in the light rail system 
(Keep, 2002). This was possible because from 1992 to 1998 the land along the route 
was owned by the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), which was 
also developing the new DLR branch. In the event, a downturn in the property market 
meant that virtually no development occurred until 6-7 years after the line opened. By 
then the LDDC had been wound up, with the land disposed to other bodies, so the link 
to fund the DLR was broken.  
Another endowment funding attempt was the Ørestadsbanen Metro Line in south 
Copenhagen, where a combination of land sales and a land value tax were intended to 
capture benefits from a new light rail system (Copenhagen Transport et al 1995; Ahm, 
1999 and Jensen, 2002). The City of Copenhagen had requested money from the 
national government, which instead handed over its share of a 310-hectare site in the 
Ørestad area. The intention was that the new line would open up this site for 
development, regenerating part of the city and recapturing the development and 
construction costs. In practice the metro opened three years late and costs nearly 
doubled from the original estimate of €800M.  
Sale of development rights 
The most comprehensive and strategic example of endowment funding is provided by 
the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway (MTR). The MTR receives no subsidy, but has 
endowed land adjacent to stations and depots. These are developed in partnership with 
property companies and the subsequent revenue from their property portfolio covers 
20% of MTR operating costs and, in some cases, a substantial proportion of the 
capital cost for new metro lines (Gaffney, 1999). This mechanism works well in Hong 
Kong because of the nature of land ownership in the territory. The Hong Kong 
Government owns the freehold of all Hong Kong land and leases it for 50 or 
sometimes 70 years.  
The MTR seeks developer partners who pay the entire land premium and construction 
costs. In return, MTR contributes the property development rights that are obtained as 
part of the agreement to build the railway. Thus there is very little cash outlay 
required from the MTR and profits are earned by sharing the development income, or 
through receiving part of the assets in kind (for example a shopping centre). This 
generated income, and revenue from leasing and managing the resultant property 
portfolio, offsets the construction costs for new MTR extensions.  
The MTR takes the lead in implementing the strategy, which commences at the 
feasibility stage of the planning of any new line. Along three new urban lines, 18 
property sites were developed, consisting of 28,000 apartments in ten estates, 150,500 
m2 of retail in three shopping centres (each located above a train depot), and 
128,500m 2 of office space. MTR retains the management of all of this development.  
On the new Hong Kong Airport Railway, the scope for development was substantial 
and is predicted to yield between $HK15bn and $HK20bn (£1-1.5bn) from 
developers, contributing over half of the construction cost.  
 11
Summary 
Endowment can be a useful funding mechanism but it needs to be undertaken 
strategically. It is important to note that the endowment mechanism requires the 
vesting of additional land and property to the operator specifically to yield an income, 
or the legal right to acquire land at existing use value. It works best where there is 
integration between land ownership and public transport infrastructure developer, and 
where the latter has built up a capability in property development. Clearly endowment 
funding is vulnerable to delay and the vagaries of the property market.  
Conclusion: Taxes, Deals or Endowment? 
A number of issues have emerged from this review of funding sources from property 
owners and developers. First, there are strengths, problems and risks associated with 
all three types of measure. Taxes and charges are the most reliable continuous source 
while partnership deals tend to be one-off payments and endowment schemes need 
careful design and tailoring to funding needs (e.g. if a revenue stream is needed, a 
one-off partnership payment will be of little use). Figure 2 provides an analysis of the 
basic nature of the different types of funding mechanisms. 
 One-Off Irregular Continuous 
Taxes and 
charges 
Developer Charges and  Impact Fees 
 
Earmarked Property and 
land value taxes 
BADS, BIDS 
Partnership 
Deals 
Connection fees 
Benefit sharing 
Land endowment  
Endowment Land sale Betterment capture  
Figure 2: Typology of One-off, Irregular and Continuous funding mechanisms. 
In general, taxes and charges produce a more continuous income, whereas 
partnerships and endowments are largely one-off or irregular income sources. As 
noted at the outset, there is an increased need for a revenue stream to service capital 
payments. This has led to attempts to adapt inherently ‘one-off’ mechanisms to 
produce a more continuous revenue stream.  
Such attempts have had mixed results. Developer charges are irregular, but in some 
places are being reformed to produce a more continuous revenue source. Land 
endowment is also an irregular (and often unpredictable) income source, but its 
advanced use in places like Hong Kong show it can be strategically developed into a 
continuous income source once a property portfolio is developed. Commercial 
partnerships and deals, although politically attractive, seem to be most firmly in the 
irregular and ‘one-off’ categories. The challenge is therefore whether these can be 
realistically developed into a useful baseline revenue stream. 
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As well as a problem of timing is one of space. The areas where a property funding 
mechanism is most viable may not be where the public transport investment is most 
needed. A city-wide or regional approach may overcome this problem, but politically 
it may be difficult to extract income from lucrative property sites that receive no 
benefit at all from the subsequent public transport development.  
A further issue concerns the core rationale of these various mechanisms. Are they 
‘value capture’ or ‘cost capture’? There is some blurring between these two concepts, 
but basically:   
• Cost Capture is where the cost of a development is estimated and is then 
allocated proportionately to the benefiting land owners/developers.  
• Value Capture is where the financial benefit to land owners/developers is 
estimated and part of this is captured. 
The two concepts are related. Clearly cost capture is involved following an estimate 
of value capture, but the latter inherently reflects an ability to pay, whereas cost 
capture is not. This links into the geographical problem. For example costs of an inner 
city metro line may be allocated to property owners along its route, but this may be 
unrelated to their ability to pay or the rise in property values associated with the new 
metro line. 
What seems to have happened is that a number of property funding mechanisms have 
evolved, or been adapted from simply what is available, without clearly thinking 
through such first principles. This is possibly the root of several of the problems with 
property funding measures, although more pragmatic issues (like over-dependence on 
the short-term vagaries of the property market) have tended to mask this strategic 
design issue.  
There is one final and important conclusion. All of the mechanisms reviewed here are 
rooted in the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle of public finance.  Modern earmarked 
funding measures that integrate with transport and environmental policy are not of 
this nature. They stem from the alternative principle that the ‘polluter pays’. The 
property owner and developer measures charge those who are ‘good’ - i.e. are 
responsible in their environmental and transport behaviour and not those who are 
‘bad’ in their environmental and transport behaviour. 
Here is a strategic dilemma. As noted previously, there is a danger that the substantial 
use of ‘beneficiary pays’ mechanisms might encourage property developers to 
relocate away from areas well served by public transport, so generating a structural 
shift to an even more car-intensive system! Theoretically this should not be so, so 
long as the tax is no greater than the benefit achieved from the investment that it 
funds. However in practice perceptions and decision making may be different and the 
distribution of the benefits of the public transport benefit may be uneven.   
This means that there needs to be great care in developing the beneficiary pays 
rationale beyond that of a minor revenue source. A mix of beneficiary and polluter 
pays mechanisms could produce contradictory signals, cancelling out the effects of 
each other. If a government were to adopt an overall ‘polluter pays’ taxation regime 
for property owners and developers, then it would matter little some ‘beneficiary 
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pays’ mechanisms were used within this context. For example, all property and 
developer taxation could be weighted according to a measure of environmental 
impact, including the public transport accessibility of a site (overall carbon emissions 
by a site’s employees and visitors might be used). There could be additional tax 
breaks for capital and revenue spent on ‘greening’ employee and customer travel (e.g. 
through site Travel Plans) and the like.  
Such a coherent ‘polluter pays’ taxation regime does not so far exist. It is arguably 
fair that beneficiaries should pay a proportion of what they gain from public transport 
improvements, as well as polluters paying their external costs. The two are not 
mutually exclusive, but are two sets of benefits. Overall, a package of measures could 
in principle be developed that both recaptures a proportion of the benefit from 
property owners and developers, and is counterbalanced by ‘polluter pays’ 
mechanisms.  These would ensure that it makes business sense to locate in accessible 
areas well served by public transport. 
References 
Ahm, K. (1999) Personal communication, Head of finance, Ørestadsselskabet, 
Copenhagen. 
Bushell, C. (1994) Jane’s urban transport systems 1993/94. Jane’s Information Group, 
Coulsdon, Surrey. 
Collins S. (2002) Personal communication, Cambridgeshire County Council, 
Cambridge, July. 
Commission of the European Communities (1995) Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing 
in Transport. Policy options for internalising the external costs of transport in the 
European Union. Green Paper. CEC, COM (95) 691, Brussels. 
Copenhagen Transport, Danish Ministry of Transport, Arhus sporveje. (1995) The 
financing of urban public transportation systems, Draft Report, Copenhagen, May. 
Cumberbatch, S. (2004) Service boost with BID levy, Surveyor, 21 October, 10. 
Farrell, S. (1999) Personal communication, Imperial College, University of London, 
27 July. 
Gaffney, P. (1999) Financing Transit in Hong Kong, Urban Public Transport Funding, 
UITP Seminar, Paris, 13-14 October. 
Gibbons. (2000) Personal communication. Metro Council, Minneapolis/St Paul, 
Minnesota, January. 
Goldman, T., Corbett, S., and Wachs, M. (2001) Local Option Transportation Taxes 
in the United States, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California at 
Berkeley, Research Report UCB-ITS-RR-2001-3, March. 
 14
Jensen, J. (2002) Personal interview, Land Valuation Assessment Officer, City of 
Copenhagen, June. 
Keep, D. (2002) Personal interview, Company Secretary, Docklands Light Railway, 
London, May. 
Knox, J. K. (1996) Benefit Assessment Districts. Enhancing the Quality of Life in 
California, Planning & Conservation League and PCL Foundation, Sacramento, 
California. Visit http://www.pcl.org/Store/benereport.html.  
McDaniel, J. B., and White, S. M. (1999) The Zoning and Real Estate Implications of 
Transit-Oriented Development, TCRP Project J-5, Legal Aspects of Transit and 
Intermodal Transportation Programs, Transit Cooperative Research Program, Federal 
Transit Administration, Legal Research Digest, January, Number 12. 
Metropolitan Council (1999) Public transit – Metro Transit, 
http://www.metrocouncil.org/transit/metrotra.htm, Minneapolis/St Paul, Minnesota. 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority of Los Angeles (2002) Benefit Assessment 
Districts Program, Benefit Assessment Districts Program Office, MTA Los Angeles. 
Visit http://www.mta.net/trans_planning/CPD/BAD/default.htm.  
Moore N (2001) Personal communication, Team leader implementation, Planning 
Division of Bracknell Forest Council, Berkshire. 
Simpson, B.J. (1994) Urban public transport today. E&FN Spon, London. 
Slack, E. (2001) Alternative approaches to taxing land and real property, Research 
Paper, Enid Slack Consulting Inc., October. Visit http://www.worldbank.org. Last 
accessed 31 May 2002. 
Toronto Transit Commission (2001) Queen Street East Development – Entrance 
Connection (Maritime Tower), TTC Meeting Report 18 July, Toronto. Visit 
http://www.ttc.ca/postings/gso-comrpt/documents/report/f1264/_conv.htm. 
Transit Cooperative Research Program (1998) Funding strategies for public 
transportation, TRCP Report 31, v1/2, Project H-7 FY 95, Transportation Research 
Board, National Research Council, Federal Transit Administration, National 
Academy Press, Washington DC. 
Tsukada, S. and Kuranami, C. (1994) Value Capture: the Japanese Experience, in 
Farrell S (ed), Financing Transport Infrastructure, PTRC, London, January. 
Ubbels B, Enoch M P, Potter S and Nijkamp P (2004) Unfare Solutions: local 
earmarked charges to fund public transport. London, Spon Press. 
US Environmental Protection Agency (1999) A Guidebook of Financial Tools - 
Paying for sustainable environmental systems. Office of the chief financial 
 15
officer, US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington DC, April. Visit 
http://www.epa.gov/efinpage/guidebook/guidebooktp.htm. 
Van den Branden, T., Knight, P., Potter, S., Enoch, M. P., Ubbels, B., and Nijkamp, 
P. (2000) Fair and efficient pricing in transport - the role of charges and taxes, 
Research Project for DG TREN, European Commission, Oscar Faber, Birmingham. 
Whelan, J. (2003) Funding London’s Transport Needs. London, Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors.  
Acknowledgements 
Grateful thanks are extended to Barry Ubbels and Professor Peter Nijkamp of the Free 
University Amsterdam who participated in the research from which this paper is 
derived, and to those who took the time to be interviewed. 
